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The Dynamics of the Creation, Evolution, and 
Disappearance of Terrorist Internet Forums
Manuel Ricardo Torres-Soriano, Public Law Department (Political Science Section), Pablo de Olavide University, 
Seville, Spain
An examination of the organizational nature of the threat posed by jihadi terrorism, supplying quantitative and qualitative data on the dynamics behind the 
creation, evolution, and disappearance of the main jihadi Internet forums during the period 2008–2012. An analysis of the origins and functions of the forums, 
their links with terrorist organizations, their internal structures, and the processes accounting for their stability in cyberspace shows that far from representing 
a horizontal structure where the main actors are a network of followers, the terrorist presence on the Internet is in fact a hierarchical organization in which in-
tervention by formal terrorist organizations plays a crucial role.
Recent years have witnessed a very interesting theoretical 
debate on the organizational nature of jihadi terrorism and 
its evolution over the past decade. Center stage in the dis-
cussion has been occupied by two American academics: 
Marc Sageman (2004, 2008) and Bruce Hoffman (2008). 
Whereas the former argues that the post-9/11 counter-
terrorism response has resulted in effective control of ter-
rorist actions passing to the grass-roots level, giving rise to 
a leaderless jihad in which terrorist groups play a secondary 
role, the latter argues that formal organizations, par-
ticularly Al Qaeda Central, continue to exercise a substan-
tial degree of strategic and operational control.
Supporters of both arguments have analyzed terrorist plots 
executed or foiled in recent years and arrived at contra-
dictory conclusions with respect to how terrorist cells are 
formed, their links to organizations, and the main profile 
of the terrorist threat in the West, namely, whether it comes 
from independent cells and imitators (bunch of guys and 
wannabes, to borrow Sageman’s terms) or from the actions 
of formal global organizations.1
This article contributes to the academic debate by provid-
ing quantitative and qualitative data on jihadist Internet 
forums, offering new elements for consideration in the de-
bate on the organizational nature of the jihadi threat. Few 
monographs have examined the functioning of jihadi for-
ums by measuring their main data (Kimmage and Ridolfo 
2007; Kimmage 2008; Zelin and Borow 2013). The present 
contribution also seeks to fill some of the gaps by under-
taking a descriptive analysis of the dynamics explaining the 
creation, evolution, and disappearance of these sites.
The internet has become the main resource in jihadi com-
munication strategies (Kohlmann 2006). Terrorists make ex-
tensive use of technology for communication purposes, as 
well as for recruitment, propaganda, fund-raising, and train-
ing (Weimann 2006a). Jihadist activity on the internet has 
evolved over the years. Initially, the web activities of terrorist 
organizations took the form of top-down websites (Zelin 
2011): a series of platforms created to disseminate doctrinal 
materials and propaganda. Participation by internet users 
was restricted to consumption of said content and assistance 
This article is part of a Research Project financed by the 
Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation „The Or-
ganizational Structure of International Terrorism: Im-
plications for European Security (CSO2010–17849)”, 
directed by Professor Javier Jordán.
1 Many authors have since underlined the mixed 
or multifaceted nature of global terrorism (Reinares 
2008, 2010), the complementarity of the views of 
Sageman and Hoffman (Neumann, Evans, and Pan-
tucci 2011; Jordán 2012), and – after detailed study 
of its organizational evolution – Al Qaeda Central’s 
capacity for survival and self-regeneration (Gunar-
atna and Oreg 2010).
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in its dissemination through distribution in different 
formats. Following the September 11 attacks, the websites 
created and administered by these groups were no longer 
allowed to operate with impunity and they began to dis-
appear due to continuous harassment by security forces, in-
telligence services, and hackers. Jihadi organizations 
abandoned their aspiration to maintain “official” websites as 
a point of contact between the group and its followers. By 
way of alternative strategy, they switched their attention to an 
apparently more horizontal and diffuse internet presence. In-
ternet forums drawing their inspiration from the “Web 2.0” 
philosophy are the main manifestation of this new erainter-
net: a new generation of web portals based on virtual social 
communities and a range of services that encourage collabor-
ation and flexible exchange of information among users. In-
ternet users leave behind their previous status as passive 
consumers of online materials (Web 1.0) and participate in a 
virtual community, also producing content themselves.
In appearance at least, the jihadist presence on the internet 
has moved away from a structure of “official” websites con-
trolled by the propaganda apparatuses of hierarchical organ-
izations (Torres, Jordán, and Horsburgh 2006) towards a 
network in which the lead role is played by a mass of radical 
supporters with only tenuous ties to formal groups. However, 
as I will argue, the current structure of jihadi internet forums 
is only viable on the basis of their active links with “formal” 
terrorist organizations, which make them interesting and at-
tractive to a broad community of followers. In order to reach 
this conclusion we will examine the origins and functions of 
such forums, the manner in which they forge links with ter-
rorist organizations, their internal structure, and the pro-
cesses accounting for their stability in cyberspace.
1. Methodology and Information Sources
The data used in the article were obtained through detailed 
monitoring of the main jihadi internet forums between Ja-
nuary 2011 and June 2012 (inclusive). The qualitative data 
are derived from a content analysis of the materials avail-
able on the forums and a quantification of the devel-
opment of the number of users, discussion topics, and 
posts. In order to offer a perspective over a longer time-
frame, information was drawn from Internet Archive,2 the 
comprehensive virtual library of all websites that have been 
available at some stage on the internet. However, it should 
be noted that the information offered by the Archive is de-
rived from random, unsystematic captures that preclude 
quantification of certain dynamics. Accordingly, only data 
from the aforementioned eighteen-month period of direct 
observation was used to measure these aspects.
In selecting sites for analysis, attention focused on forums 
(mostly in Arabic) constituting the “inner circle” or core of 
the jihadist internet presence (see Table 1). This elite group 
is formed by websites with the largest followings and grea-
test influence among the jihadi cyber-community. Forums 
that host radical content but can be considered secondary 
because they tend merely to re-post content from other sites 
(as opposed received directly from producers) were there-
fore excluded from our detailed examination. Nonetheless, 
by way of additional input to the study, occasional reference 
will be made to data from these “concentric rings.”
Table 1: Forums Analyzed (January 2011 – June 2012)
2 http://archive.org/index.php
Name
Atahadi: http://www.atahadi.com/
vb/index.php/
Al Jahafal:  
http://al-jahafal.com/vb/
Al Amanh:  
http://www.al-amanh.net/vb/
Al Qimmah:  
http://alqimmah.net/
Al Jahad:  
http://www.aljahad.com/vb/
Al Shamukh:  
http://www.shamikh1.net/vb/
Ansar Al Mujahidin Arabic Forum:  
http://as-ansar.com/vb/index.php
Description
General forum in Arabic. Also features 
subdirectories in various European 
languages.
General forum in Arabic. Focuses par-
ticularly on issues concerning the 
jihad in the Maghreb.
Forum in Arabic focused on the jihad 
in Palestine/Israel.
Forum mainly in Somali and, to a 
lesser extent, Arabic. Largely focused 
on the jihad in Somalia.
General forum in Arabic. The youngest 
forum in the selection.
General forum in Arabic. Considered 
the most influential.
General forum. Also has English ver-
sion.
IJCV : Vol. 7 (1) 2013, pp. 164 – 178
Torres-Soriano: Creation, Evolution, and Disappearance of Terrorist Internet Forums 167
Additional data were obtained from forums such as Al Fa-
loja,3 Al Hesbah,4 and Al Ekhlaas,5 which were no longer 
operational at the time of the research but played a leading 
role in the jihadi internet community for many years.
2. Origin and Functions of Jihadi Internet Forums
According to Anne Stenersen (2009): “the early history of 
jihadi websites remains very poorly understood. Most of us 
started studying them too late.” By the time these spaces 
began to attract the attention of security agencies and the 
specialist community, they were already a key component 
of the terrorist presence on the internet.
Stenersen cites an article by an influential jihadist ideo-
logue briefly outlining the history of jihadi forums, the ori-
gins of which can be traced back to a series of 
Islamist-inspired websites from the late 1990s.6 Although 
the topics covered were not exclusively jihadist, the sites in-
cluded information and user comments on violent con-
flicts involving Muslims. The 9/11 attacks spawned a group 
of forums whose content clearly supported Al Qaeda ter-
rorism. The most prominent was Al Tawhid, which fea-
tured contributions from leading terrorist jihad ideologists 
and preachers, including the London-based Jordanian Abu 
Qatada and Egyptian Abu Hamza, and is still active today.7 
Despite being a “traditional” website full of doctrinal ma-
terials for downloading, it also contained a forum allowing 
interaction among readers.
The first jihadi forum used by a terrorist organization as a 
primary propaganda channel was Muntada Al Ansar Al Isla-
mi (Islam Supporters Forum),8 which appeared at the end 
of 2003. The site achieved considerable public impact due to 
the contributions of one particular user, Abu Maysara Al 
Iraqi, the official spokesman of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The or-
ganization, founded and led by Jordanian terrorist Abu 
Musab Al Zarqawi, gave up its efforts to maintain an official 
propaganda website after constant cyber-attacks. Dis-
tributing materials to a website not formally affiliated to the 
organization ensured it a continuing presence in cyberspace. 
Thus began a symbiotic relationship between a terrorist 
group and a radical website, which saw the former greatly 
enhance its communications capabilities and the latter earn 
prestige and influence on account of its privileged ties with 
the mujahideen. This model was subsequently emulated by 
other groups and terrorist networks that had encountered 
similar problems in seeking to maintain an effective internet 
presence. In May 2004 the forum was knocked offline by a 
cyber-attack after it posted a gruesome video of Zarqawi’s 
beheading of American contractor Nicholas Berg. It quickly 
returned, although as a security measure no longer offering 
open access to all internet users and instead requiring regis-
tration to view content. The forum had, however, become 
the de facto official website for Al Qaeda in Iraq, which 
made it a prime target for actors seeking to neutralize the 
group’s presence on the internet. It disappeared soon there-
after, although its work was to be carried on by other lead-
ing forums such as Al Ekhlas (“Sincerity”).9
Jihadi groups concluded that if they sent their materials ex-
clusively to a single forum, it would eventually disappear 
since it would become identified as an extension of the 
group and would fall foul of the same pressure suffered by 
official sites. Accordingly, they opted to send materials sim-
ultaneously to several trusted sites, thus blurring the links 
between the mujahideen and internet platforms. Redun-
dancy of content meant that distribution was maintained 
even if certain sites disappeared.
The decision by jihadi groups to focus on internet forums 
was driven by the aim of ensuring a more stable cyberspace 
presence (Torres-Soriano 2009), but also brought with it a 
range of additional advantages, including:
a)  Ease of use. It is considerably easier to design and ad-
minister a forum than a conventional website. Most 
3 http://faloja1.com/vb (defunct).
4 http://www.alhesbah1.net (defunct).
5 http://www.al-ekhlaas.net/forum/ (defunct).
6 Mihdar, “Jihadist forums, pros and cons. His-
torical analysis” (in Arabic), Medad Al Soyoof Net-
work, http://www.almedad.com/vb/anoiy-aaa-
caeiu/9915-caaaeeiice-caiaciie-ac-aac-aeac-uaiac-
eiaia-eaniii-sscaa.html (accessed 03/03/2009, now 
defunct).
7 Pulpit of Monotheism and Jihad (in Arabic): 
http://www.tawhed.ws/.
8 http://www.al-ansar.biz (defunct).
9 http://www.al-ekhlaas.net (defunct).
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are based on commercial applications that require no 
programming skills.10 Users merely fill in blank fields 
to input content into a structure whose design and 
basic functions are pre-established. The software does 
allow certain customization options, particularly 
graphics, but the platform architecture is rigid. This 
explains the great similarities in the organization, 
functioning, and even visual appearance of the vari-
ous forums.
b) Reinforcing global jihad rhetoric. On a single site, forum 
users can access materials supplied by groups operating 
in very different regions such as the Philippines, Chech-
nya, Pakistan, Indonesia, Algeria, etc. Bringing all such 
propaganda under one roof gives followers the impres-
sion that the actions of the different jihadi groups form 
part of a single conflict in defense of Islam that has no 
national borders or divides.
c) Encouraging a sense of belonging to a single community. 
Forums have become a virtual meeting and interaction 
space for people who share the same radical beliefs. 
Such individuals may find that their ideas and at-
titudes are a minority position or rejected in their im-
mediate social circles, and this might weaken their 
convictions (Jordán 2009). internet forums allow them 
to counter that isolation by connecting them to thou-
sands of web users worldwide who share the same set 
of beliefs and attitudes. This virtual socialization func-
tion has acquired increasing importance as jihadi net-
works have seen their visibility in the physical world 
diminish as a result of repression by police and the 
courts (Vidino 2011).
d) Facilitating communication and creating networks. 
Forums facilitate the creation of links between iso-
lated individuals who do not know each other per-
sonally, and provide them with instruments for 
private communication via chat rooms, restricted-ac-
cess posts, and IP telephony. These interactions may 
lead to real-world contact between the individuals 
concerned.
e) Strengthening virtual recruitment. Virtual activities 
cultivate users’ reputations as supporters of the jihad. 
The volume and quality of their contributions con-
stitute an important indicator for recruitment by ter-
rorist groups and individuals seeking to set up 
operational networks. Recruitment can be more effec-
tive if targeted to individuals whose track record as 
users of jihadi internet forums demonstrates their re-
ceptiveness.
3. Forum Creation and Operational Dynamics
The jihadi forum universe is a clearly hierarchical one. 
At the top of the pyramid are a small number that stand 
apart from the rest, receiving materials directly from or-
ganizations that perpetrate acts of terrorism and from 
renowned ideologists. This privileged status makes such 
forums a point of reference for others, which merely 
replicate content that originally appeared in these top-
level websites.
Cooperative ties with terrorist organizations are in them-
selves sufficient reason to explain the success or failure of 
the platforms. Forums benefiting from “patronage” can at-
tract considerably more internet users than others. Sup-
porters of the jihadi message on the internet generally 
choose to participate in virtual communities that can dem-
onstrate that they are trusted by the mujahideen. Admis-
sion and growth dynamics can be explained by Metcalfe’s 
law,11 according to which the usefulness of a network in-
creases at an accelerating rate as each new user is added. 
Endorsement by a formal organization allows swift and 
sustained growth in the number of registered users (see 
Figure 1).
10 The most widely used forum software is VBul-
letin, which is also used by many jihadi forums.
11 A principle coined by Bob Metcalfe, the inven-
tor of the Ethernet protocol used to network com-
puters.
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Figure 1: Membership of Main Jihadi Internet Forums (Annual Average, 2008–June 2012)
between forums and organizations tend to arise in three 
different ways.
First, the administrator or administrators may have formal 
links with the terrorist group and operate the forum as part 
of those activities. The forum is not the group’s official 
website, however. Rather it is a self-appointed initiative in 
support of all mujahideen. One such case is the Saudi 
citizen Walid bin Muhammad Al-Sama’ani who, prior to 
his death in 2005, combined membership of Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula with his activities as the founder and 
administrator of the Al Ekhlaas forum (SITE 2007).
Secondly, forum members may be individuals who, al-
though not formally part of a terrorist organization, pos-
Forums that replicate propaganda from other websites find 
it extremely difficult to offer a differentiated “product” that 
is attractive to radical internet users. Despite replicating 
considerable volumes of material from other sites, some 
websites are unable to attain the minimum threshold of 
users required to establish a virtuous circle.12 Ties with ter-
rorist organizations are essential to generate the critical mass 
of committed users needed to guarantee future viability.
Links between formal terrorist organizations and internet 
forums are based on relationships of mutual trust. Due to 
the risk that a virtual community may have been infiltrated 
by intelligence agencies or other actors with hostile inten-
tions, jihadi groups are constantly suspicious and few for-
ums succeed in forging collaborative ties. The links 
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AL JAHAFAL
AI AMANH
AI QIMMAH
AL JAHAD
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837
5,271
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4,365
9,560
5,651
2,471
15,537
739
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7,888
7,899
2,528
24,309
1,889
17,064
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12 One example of the difficulties involved is pro-
vided by the Arabic forum Shabaka Al Haqiqa Al 
Ikhbaria (Truth Information Network) 
(http://www.thetruthn.com/vb/). The site was run 
from Spain by Moroccan Abdellatif Oulad Chiba, 
until his arrest in August 2011. During its three-
month existence, it managed to attract only thirteen 
registered users despite having more than 7,800 dis-
cussion threads and 10,000 posts from other sites, 
which were uploaded daily by the site administrator. 
See Audiencia Nacional (Juzgado Central de In-
strucción nº 3), “Diligencias previas 126/2011,” Au-
gust 20, 2011. http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/
ultimahora/media/201108/20/espana/20110820elpe-
punac_1_Pes_PDF.pdf
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sess a network of social relations that facilitate contact. 
Such cases include individuals who travel to areas where ji-
hadi groups operate openly and visibly (for example 
Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.) but fail in their attempts 
to join the armed struggle. Nonetheless, their credibility 
and network of contacts mean that their online activism is 
endorsed by their collaboration with formal groups. 
Examples include the members of the Global Islamic 
Media Front propaganda platform who were arrested in 
Canada, Austria, and Germany (Torres-Soriano 2012a).
Finally, a forum may initially operate without collaboration 
from terrorist groups, yet over time acquire credibility that at-
tracts interest from formal groups, which take the initiative in 
proposing collaboration. By way of example, the technical ex-
pertise demonstrated in various forums by UK-based cyber-
jihadist Younis Tsouli brought him to the attention of the 
media spokesman of Al Qaeda in Iraq. The organization initi-
ated close cooperation with the young Moroccan, whose inter-
net pseudonym was Irhabi 007 (Terrorist 007). Even though 
no face-to-face contact ever took place between Tsouli and the 
Iraqi group, his internet credibility made him a key link in the 
group’s online propaganda (Labi 2006; O’Neill 2007).
The relationships described above have been affected by the 
emergence of a new player acting as an intermediary be-
tween jihadi forums and terrorist groups: jihadist media 
distributor networks (Rogan 2007). The mission of these 
organizations is to assist with the dissemination of propa-
ganda prepared by the mujahideen and their ideologists. 
Their roles include editing raw material sent by terrorist or-
ganizations, subtitling and translation, and designing web-
site infographics. However, their most important role is to 
authenticate the propaganda of the terrorist groups and act 
as intermediaries between the organizations and internet 
forums. Administrators therefore need to develop relations 
of trust with the media organizations that monopolize the 
dissemination of “official” propaganda. The role of these 
organizations has become increasingly important in the 
aftermath of the damage caused to the credibility of the ji-
hadi message by the appearance of fake communiqués.
The most important of the aforementioned media organiz-
ations is the Al Fajr Media Center, an unofficial distributor 
of Al Qaeda propaganda. When Al Fajr chooses to cooper-
ate with a forum, radical users understand that the website 
in question has the seal of approval of the mujahideen and 
its content is therefore to be trusted.
4. Content
Jihadi forum content is divided into sections and sub-
sections, the most frequent being “Statement section” and 
“General section.” The first contains communiqués re-
leased by terrorist groups. Users are not normally able to 
post contributions in this section, which is reserved for the 
authorized spokespersons of the various jihadi organiz-
ations. The “General section” tends to be the most active 
since participation is open to all users to share news, 
opinions, and links regarding any jihad-related issue.
Other typical sections include history, Muslim family, 
translations into other languages, and “members only” 
training sections supplying information on bomb-making 
and weapons.
Administrators often give prominence to particular content 
by inserting banners, large-font texts, and animations at the 
top of the forum site. Only administrators can insert these 
elements, which are designed to draw attention to content 
of special importance, such as that messages from jihadi 
leaders or ideologists, images of major terrorist actions, or 
urgent statements. The banners are usually standardized 
and disseminated to a number of forums on which the 
statement or media release is posted (Musawi 2010). Occa-
sionally, they are placed before the material itself is even 
uploaded in order to generate expectations ahead of the re-
lease of a video, audio recording, or written statement.
Each directory or sub-directory in turn comprises a group of 
discussion threads (Figure 2) allowing users to post comments 
within a thread (Figure 3). However, not all the topics generate 
a truly collective debate. Data from the studied forums show 
that a topic attracts an average of 4.3 posts, with considerable 
differences between subjects. As with “conventional” internet 
forums, only certain posts will generate up to one hundred re-
sponses, (here usually those from terrorist organizations or 
ideologists) while other topics (for instance, those started by 
low-profile users) may fail to attract even a single response.
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Figure 2: Jihadist Forums – Average Number of Threads per Year
Although the internet forums allow users to upload photo-
graphs and text, jihadi propaganda increasingly takes the 
form of sophisticated video and audio statements. This 
requires significant data storage and transfer capabilities 
that the forums are often unable to supply. To evade data 
restrictions, jihadists resort to the same websites used to il-
legally download movies, music, software, and child por-
nography: document-sharing and file hosting websites 
(Torres-Soriano 2009). To attract clients, these web services 
offer free limited use, but to upload larger files, users have 
to pay for a premium version. Jihadists have simply used 
stolen credit cards to pay for these services, or hacking soft-
ware to evade the limitations imposed on free use (Krebs 
2009). Among the contributions most appreciated by vir-
tual communities is the ability to download jihadist videos 
and communiqués and rehost them on cloud computing 
services, thus ensuring the files are always available (via 
new download links if necessary).
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Figure 3: Jihadist Forums – Average Number of Posts per Year
b) Moderators: This is also a small group, albeit larger than 
that of the administrators. The moderators’ job is to 
monitor compliance with forum rules, ensuring ideo-
logical coherence of the texts and materials posted on 
the websites. They have the power to delete content con-
sidered counter-productive or hostile to the jihadist 
message. Moderator status is granted by administrators 
to the most active users and therefore represents a pro-
motion within the forum structure.
c) Users: This group represents the overwhelming bulk of 
forum participants. Once they have registered and been 
admitted by the administrators, users are entitled to 
view content and post messages, responding publicly to 
other users or even contacting them directly by private 
message, on-line chat, or IP telephone calls.
By keeping track of member activity and interaction, the 
platform is able to establish a numerical system of pro-
motion and distinction based on level of activity and quality 
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5. Population and Internal Structure
Dutch intelligence estimates the number of regular followers 
of jihadist websites to be approximately 25,000 individuals 
in around one hundred countries (AIVD 2010). These indi-
viduals usually participate in several forums at the same 
time, using different aliases for security and anonymity.
The population of the forums comprises a three-tiered 
hierarchy, each with clearly demarcated functions:
a) Administrators: Administrator status is held by a small 
number of activists situated at the pinnacle of the plat-
form. Only the administrators know the forum manage-
ment passwords. Administrator privileges give access to 
all the functions offered by virtual platforms: overall 
forum design, content management, admission or rejec-
tion of members, access to user profiles and navigation 
habits, etc. Control over these functions accords ad-
ministrators an advantageous position with respect to 
online recruitment.
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of participation. Profile information on each user is accom-
panied by a series of indicators relating to the number of 
topics and posts published, the frequency with which the in-
dividuals thank other authors for their posts, or the thanks 
they receive from others for their own contributions. This 
system seeks what some have called “gamification” (Brach-
man and Levine 2011), a term used to describe game-like 
attributes applied to non-game activities. The website cre-
ators factor in a strong element of competition to encourage 
greater participant involvement. By being more active, users 
earn “rewards” that impact positively on their self-esteem or 
on scope of accessible forum functions. For example, at-
taining a given level allows the user’s name to be associated 
with “ranks” or “labels” such as senior correspondent, war-
rior, martyr, emir, sheikh, etc. that publicly attest to their 
reputation and commitment. Other types of reward include 
entitlement to use an exclusive avatar or animation that 
draws attention to that particular user’s contributionsahead 
of those of others. Promotion also gives access to forum 
content reserved for members with proven credibility and 
commitment. The most usual reward takes the form of ac-
cess to restricted subdirectories containing sensitive in-
formation such as bomb-making instructions, use of 
weapons, cyber-crime manuals and software, etc.
This automatic system of promotion, which is also used in 
other types of forum, does also have counter-productive ef-
fects, however. The majority of posts on these websites are 
designed to achieve rapid and effortless promotion on the 
forum ladder and hence take the form of useless or insig-
nificant comments such as brief thanks expressed to other 
users, or expressions of joy, support, or piety. In other 
cases, comments are plagiarized from other jihadi forums 
and do not contribute in any way to enriching the jihadist 
discourse (JWMG 2012). As a result, the main forum “re-
wards,” such as designation as a moderator or adminis-
trator, cannot be earned automatically. Only the 
individuals responsible for the forum have the power to re-
cruit users to roles crucial to its proper functioning.
Although forums do allow members to be upgraded to 
content-producer status, in reality the vast majority of 
members are best described as “passive consumers” or “si-
lent observers” (Kohlmann 2010), who merely browse 
available content but do not contribute to the site. As with 
other internet forums, only a small group of registered 
users play an active and continuous part in jihadi forums 
(Ducol 2012; Awan 2007). In the case of the forums studied 
here, active users represent on average just 11 percent of 
the total user population, reflecting the 90-9-1 rule of par-
ticipation inequality in online communities (Kimmage 
2009). Said rule holds that 1 percent of users (active 
members) are responsible for 90 percent of postings, 9 per-
cent (members) are responsible for 10 percent of postings, 
and 90 percent (visitors) are “lurkers” who read available 
content but post nothing themselves.
Although the number of users who play a very active part 
in these forums is small,13 not all can be classed as true 
“producers” (AIVD 2012), in the sense of individuals 
whose knowledge and experience equip them to contribute 
relevant posts on matters of doctrine or strategy, technical 
information, or operational guidelines. This elite group 
would also include users who act as “correspondents,” 
writing from a conflict zone in which jihadist organizations 
operate openly. Their contributions are particularly ap-
preciated by users since they describe the life and experi-
ences of the mujahideen fighting the enemy directly. Some 
of these authors subsequently join a terrorist organization 
after building themselves a solid track-record as cyber-ac-
tivists that affords them iconic status in these virtual com-
munities.14 A prime example is the Jordanian physician 
13 A prime example of a committed user is the Saudi 
national Muhdar Hussein Almalki, who was arrested in 
Valencia (Spain) in March 2012. He was dubbed “Al 
Qaeda’s librarian” by Spanish police due to the massive 
amounts of jihadi propaganda he stored and shared with 
others on the Internet. Investigators discovered that he 
had achieved moderator status on some of the main jihadi 
forums, to which he devoted eight to fifteen hours daily. 
His exceptional level of activity is attested by two thou-
sand posts on the Shamukh forum and seven thousand on 
Al Faloja. See Audiencia Nacional (Juzgado Central de In-
strucción nº 5), “Diligencias Previas 26/2011,” March 30, 
2012. http://ep00.epimg.net/descargables/
2012/03/30/d61bac3fc1fa90da6d87e2edd6e1fbe4.pdf. See 
also Internet Haganah, “In search of al-Qaida’s naughty 
librarian [Muhdar Hussein Almalki],” Internet Haganah, 
April 2, 2012. http://forum.internet-haganah.com/show-
thread.php?774.
14 As is the case for the Jordanian cyber-jihadist 
known on the Internet as Abu Kandahar Al Zarqawi. 
After serving as administrator and moderator of the Al 
Ekhlaas and Al Fallujah forums, he joined Al Qaeda in 
the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
from where he continued to participate in the sites, post-
ing stories about and eulogies for his fallen colleagues. 
The forums in which he participated later publicized de-
tails of his own death in December 2010 (Flade 2010).
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and suicide bomber Hammam Khalil Abu Malal al-Balawi 
who blew himself up inside a CIA base at Khost, Af-
ghanistan, on December 30, 2009, killing seven CIA em-
ployees and contractors and a Jordanian intelligence officer 
(Warrick 2011). He was a prolific blogger and, for a time, a 
moderator on the jihadi Al Hesbah internet forum.
Jihadi internet forums operate in a hostile environment. In 
recent times, various intelligence services and hackers have 
engaged in actions designed to infiltrate and block these 
spaces (Hegghammer 2010) and have succeeded in provok-
ing mutual accusations among the different radical web-
sites (Weimann 2006b). Administrators are suspicious of 
new users who quickly appear highly aggressive or express 
a clear interest in contacting forum members in person. 
Some platforms have implemented stricter self-protection 
measures such as making their entire content available only 
to registered users, stopping admission of new members, or 
accepting only new users who have been endorsed by a cur-
rent member. However, these steps have triggered con-
troversy within the jihadi internet community between 
those favoring greater security and ideological homogene-
ity, even at the risk of becoming increasingly closed and 
opaque groups, and others who fear the jihadi movement 
will turn so inward it will eventually become irrelevant 
(Torres-Soriano 2012b).
6. Stability and Disappearance of Jihadi Forums
Jihadi forums adopt different strategies to guarantee their 
continuity in cyberspace, including hosting content simul-
taneously on over a dozen synchronized mirrors (Prucha 
2008). Thanks to the interconnection between these sites, 
when one goes offline its traffic is redirected automatically 
to others offering identical content.
Despite achieving greater stability, the forums have been 
nonetheless affected by numerous temporary disruptions 
and definitive disappearances. During the eighteen-month 
period examined in detail here, each forum suffered an 
average of 3.1 “outages,” after which they were inaccessible 
for an average of 24.6 days per incident.
Forums may be hit by specific disruptions that do not affect 
other sites, or by a common cause triggering a simultaneous 
outage. By depriving it of trustworthy propaganda dis-
semination mechanisms, these general disruptions silence 
the terrorist message on the internet. The period between 
2006 and 2012 saw five major simultaneous outages, each 
averaging one week.15 It is extremely difficult to identify the 
causes of these incidents. Forums tend not to openly dis-
close the reasons for disruption, nor do government actors 
that launch covert offensives without claiming responsibility 
(Nakashima and Warwick 2012). However, information ob-
tained from various open sources helps us identify the fol-
lowing as the main causes of interruptions to service:
a) Maintenance: Administrators suspend website access tem-
porarily in order to undertake a thorough review of mem-
bership and content. This activity tends to be triggered by a 
suspicion that the site has been infiltrated. Administrators 
expel members suspected of being hostile and delete their 
contributions. “Cleaning” tasks have become increasingly 
necessary as a result of public and private initiatives aimed 
at undermining the jihadi discourse (Pantucci 2011; As-
hour 2009). One of the most famous examples is the Saudi 
Sakinah deradicalization campaign (Boucek 2008), which 
saw volunteers register on the sites concerned in a bid to 
engage in dialogue with members to persuade them that 
their beliefs were misguided from the Islamic point of view.
b) Cyber-attacks: The forum is rendered inoperative 
through hostile action perpetrated via cyberspace. Ad-
ministrators cannot restore the site until they manage to 
neutralize the cause of the technical failure. Para-
doxically, cyber-attacks bolster a site’s popularity in the 
community of supporters of jihadi terrorism, whereas 
stability is perceived as a proof of its connection with 
members of intelligence services (Musawi 2010).
15 Flashpoint Global Partners, “Major Jihadi Web 
Forum Service Outages – 2006–2012,” April 2, 2012. 
http://www.flashpoint-intel.com/images/docu
ments/pdf/0307/flashpoint_forumoutages.pdf
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c) Arrest or disappearance of key members: A temporary 
“switch-off” is often ordered to prevent enemy access 
and identify the security breaches that led to arrests. An 
example of this scenario is the shutting down of the 
Ansar al Mujahadin Arabic Forum in August 2010, im-
mediately after the arrest of one of its main adminis-
trators, the Moroccan Faical Errai, in a small town in 
Alicante (Spain).16 This police operation was a serious 
blow to the website, which remained out of action for 
the next seven months. It has also been speculated that 
the general outage that occurred in April 2012 was trig-
gered by the arrest of a prominent member of the main 
forums (also in Spain) (Levine 2010; Abend 2012).
d) Preventive shutdown: Websites voluntarily decide to sus-
pend access temporarily to prevent cyber-attacks or other 
hostile actions anticipated after a particular incident or 
on the anniversary of important dates. Examples include 
the suspension of activities by the Ansar Al-Mujahideen 
and Al-Faluja forums a few days before September 11, 
2009, in order to avoid attacks similar to those that si-
lenced jihadi forums in previous years, including in Sep-
tember 2008 when Al Qaeda was unable to disseminate 
its 9/11 commemorative video on time (JWMG 2012).
Following a cyber-attack, the websites reappear having been 
purged of all users and content considered hostile. During 
the period studied here, administrators expelled an average 
of 0.6 percent of users after an outage. While the figure is 
not particularly high, it is very revealing that an average of 7 
percent of topics and 9.5 percent of posts were removed, 
which would indicate that the expelled users were far from 
“silent observers” but rather had been extremely active on 
the sites, initiating and participating in discussions.
There is a primary cause that explains the definitive dis-
appearance of such sites: a loss of trust on the part of the 
terrorist organizations that supply the website with propa-
ganda materials. The real attraction of these sites is their 
ability to serve as an authentic source of mujahideen ma-
terial. Radical users are drawn to the prestige of sites that 
have earned the approval and trust of jihadi organizations. 
The loss of these ties sparks a mass exodus by followers, 
who seek out alternatives not suspected of enemy infil-
tration or sabotage.
One example of the aforementioned dynamics can be seen 
in the events that triggered the demise of the influential Al 
Faloja forum (Torres-Soriano 2012b). In the summer of 
2010, the website posted the first issue of Inspire, the Eng-
lish-language jihadist magazine published by Al Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula. However, the pdf file was corrupted 
and only the first few pages of the magazine were viewable. 
The forum rapidly filled with panicked comments by users 
speculating that the website may have been compromised. 
Moderators warned users to take precautions such as delet-
ing private messages and changing their passwords. The 
panic dominated the discussions and a short time later the 
website crashed. Although it returned again after a few 
days, the Al Fajr media platform, which distributed state-
ments from Al Qaeda and its affiliates, stopped supplying it 
with materials. The questionable handling of the crisis and 
sudden disappearance had damaged terrorist organiz-
ations’ trust in the forum. After a month during which Al 
Faloja displayed no original materials, it put up a message 
announcing its permanent closure without any further ex-
planation. A year later, it was disclosed in the media (Gard-
ham 2011) that the panic in the jihadi internet 
infrastructure had been caused by a cyber-attack by Brit-
ain’s MI6 intelligence service, which had replaced some of 
the pages of the original magazine with garbled computer 
code prior to its release on the web.
7. Conclusions
Internet forums play a crucial part in jihadi terrorism’s 
communications strategy. The reasons for the keen interest 
shown by terrorist groups in these platforms include the 
growing obstacles to their attempts to operate in the 
16 Audiencia Nacional (Juzgado Central de In-
strucción número 2), “Diligencias Previas 120/09-F. 
Faical Errai,” August 31, 2010. http://estaticos.el-
mundo.es/documentos/2010/08/31/auto_audi-
encia_nacional.pdf
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“physical sphere.” Increased persecution of jihadists and 
their support networks in the wake of September 11, 2001, 
has seriously undermined their capacity to attract, radical-
ize, and train new members (Filiu 2010). However, the new 
opportunities afforded to terrorism by Web 2.0 are accom-
panied by new vulnerabilities. Far from enjoying a cyber-
space sanctuary from which they can operate unhindered, 
the terrorists are subject to constant harassment.
Although the forums were initially seen as exemplifying the 
transformation of terrorist organizations into horizontal 
structures lacking a clear hierarchy and connected only by 
a common ideological discourse and plan of action, the 
fact of the matter is that these websites could not exist 
without the intervention of formal organizations. A lack of 
ties to a formal organization is in itself sufficient reason for 
a forum to fail. In reality, the websites do not conform to 
the Web 2.0 philosophy on which they are allegedly based. 
Radical forums have not operated as collaborative spaces in 
which internet users participate and contribute content 
spontaneously. Quite the contrary: they are extremely hier-
archical and governed by numerous mechanisms designed 
to control the actions of users and prevent ideological het-
erodoxy.
The three core characteristics that distinguish a network 
from other forms of organization (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni 
and Jones 2008) are noticeably absent in the case of jihadi 
internet forums.
Firstly, what distinguishes networks from other forms of 
hierarchical organization is the capacity of low-level units 
to have multiple relationships with higher-level centers, as 
well as lateral links with units at the same organizational 
level. The redundant design of a network allows its func-
tions to be performed by multiple members and thus the 
disappearance of the most important units does not com-
promise overall functioning. In jihadi forums, however, a 
small number of nodes exclusively centralize the vast ma-
jority of relations between the members of the community, 
and the forums are therefore strongly hierarchical. This 
type of organization is extremely resilient to random at-
tacks but vulnerable to targeted ones. This explains why a 
jihadi forum is less resilient than other illicit networked 
structures. Its instability is a good indicator of the existence 
of a marked pyramid structure, which means that the site 
becomes compromised every time a central operative is 
captured. The lack of equal relations among forum 
members and constant suspicion concerning attempted in-
filtration mean that replacement of said key figures does 
not occur naturally among the members of these virtual 
communities.
Secondly, networks are open to the incorporation of new 
members, provided they share common identity traits or 
interests. However, jihadi forums are increasingly reluctant 
to admit new participants due to the constant threat of in-
filtration. The actions of some sites may even be in open 
contradiction to their proselytizing goals, in that they re-
strict registration of new members or seek to survive solely 
on contributions from users with proven credibility. Thus, 
the communities end up becoming very inward-looking 
and are unable to reproduce and perpetuate themselves by 
reaching out to their target audience.
Lastly, relations within networks tend to be informal and 
loosely structured, unlike in hierarchical organizations, 
which rely on rule-governed impersonal relations. The lack 
of a central authority and rule-guided functioning means 
that decision-making and coordination in networks tend to 
be based on consensus and mutual adjustment. In jihadi 
forums, however, a clear system of rules regulates 
members’ capacities and contacts. A higher-level authority 
oversees all interaction and has the power to reward or 
punish members, while decision-making is the preserve of 
a restricted group of members, who neither inform nor 
consult other users. In fact, jihadi forums are based on the 
same software applications used by other internet forums, 
which helps explain the considerable similarities between 
all of them as regards administrator powers, forum rules, 
type of interaction between users, etc. However, in adopt-
ing this format the aim of the terrorists was not to widen 
the opportunities for interaction with followers but simply 
to increase the audience for the propaganda generated by 
the leaderships of their organizations.
The jihadists’ presence on the internet exhibits few similar-
ities with the characteristics normally associated with a 
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network. However, despite sharing features with hier-
archies, the jihadi forums have been unable to exploit the 
primary benefits of such structures. The lack of direct per-
sonal contact between members of the communities, 
coupled with the constant threat of enemy infiltration, 
generates what can turn into incapacitating mistrust within 
the group. Despite having thousands of members with dif-
ferent profiles located in dozens of countries worldwide, 
the forums are unable to fully exploit the possibilities of 
this vast human potential. Cyber-jihadists are aware that 
their contributions are closely monitored by an unknown 
number of intelligence services, journalists, and public and 
private analysts. This uncomfortable reality impacts 
negatively on the spontaneity of user participations and 
lessens the attractiveness of forums as platforms through 
which terrorist operations can be planned and coordinated 
securely. However, the main blow to the forums’ credibility 
is the permanent suspicion that some of the sites may have 
been infiltrated or indeed are controlled directly by the 
enemy. Recent years have seen emerging confirmation, as 
opposed to mere suspicion, that some virtual platforms are 
part of “information operations” launched to undermine 
the jihadi message. Furthermore, radical web users are con-
scious that the internet is responsible for many recent ar-
rests of jihadists, which reinforces their belief that 
cyberspace – and the internet forums in particular – have 
become dangerous territory. Although in recent times ter-
rorists have turned to other types of internet-based plat-
form for content dissemination and other interaction 
purposes, including YouTube, Daily Motion, Facebook, and 
– increasingly – Twitter, these continue to pose many of the 
same problems encountered in internet forums (Melea-
grou-Hitchens, Maher and Sheehan 2012). But in the ab-
sence of a viable alternative, for the moment at least, jihad 
supporters have little choice but to continue to use forums.
In conclusion, the analysis of the functioning of jihadi in-
ternet forums provided here adds weight to the argument 
that formal terrorist organizations continue to play an im-
portant role in coordinating and encouraging terrorism.
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